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In Nautilus Insurance Co. v.
Winchester Homes, Inc., 15 F.3d
371 (4th Cir. 1994), the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit resolved the ques-
tion of when a federal district court
may decline to entertain a declara-
tory judgment action properly
within its jurisdiction. The court
held that a federal district court
should normally entertain a de-
claratory judgment action unless
traditional concerns of federalism,
efficiency, and comity outweigh
the utility of declaratory relief.
Thus, the court held that deference
to the pendency of a related action
in state court is an insufficient rea-
son by itself to justify declining to
entertain a federal declaratory ac-
tion.
Nautilus Insurance Company
undertook to indemnify and defend
Reliance Wood Preserving, Inc.
("Reliance"), a Maryland corpo-
ration, against claims arising from
the production and manufacture of
its fire retardant plywood. Win-
chester Homes, Inc. ("Winches-
ter"), a Delaware corporation, filed
two claims in separate state courts
against Reliance, and thirteen other
entities, for damages suffered by
the use of their products in con-
structing residential buildings.
Winchester claimed Reliance's ply-
wood deteriorated shortly after in-
stallation.
Four months after Winchester
filed its state claims, Nautilus filed
a declaratory judgment action in
the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland asserting
that it had no duty to defend or
indemnify Reliance. Nautilus
claimed that Reliance misrepre-
sented and omitted material facts
when applying for the insurance
policy. Nautilus also argued that
the policy did not cover the product
liability claims. Reliance, Win-
chester, and two liability insurers
for Reliance, Pennsylvania
Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance
Company ("PLMIC") and Great
American Insurance Company
("GAIC"), were named as defen-
dants in the declaratory judgment
action commenced in the United
States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland. Reliance coun-
terclaimed seeking inter alia a dec-
laration that Nautilus was required
to defend and indemnify it under
the terms of the insurance policy.
Reliance later filed for bank-
ruptcyprotection. Duringthebank-
ruptcy proceedings, Reliance as-
signed its interest in the Nautilus
insurance policy to Winchester,
thereby preserving Winchester's in-
terest in obtaining judgment in the
pending tort actions. One week
prior to trial, GAIC moved to dis-
miss the federal declaratory action
due to the pendency of the state tort
actions. Over Nautilus' and
Winchester's objections, the fed-
eral district court dismissed the
action. Winchester appealed, al-
leging that the district court erred
in declining to entertain the de-
claratory judgment action. Con-
tending that Winchester did not
have standing to bring the appeal
because it was not sufficiently ag-
grieved, GAIC, joined by PLMIC
and Nautilus, moved to dismiss the
appeal.
On review, the court of ap-
peals first determined that Win-
chester, as Reliance's assignee in
the Nautilus insurance policy, was
sufficiently aggrieved to appeal the
judgment of the district court. Next,
the court examined the statutory
language of the Federal Declara-
tory Judgment Act ("FDJA") and
related case law, and concluded
that the district court erred in de-
clining to entertain the declaratory
judgment action.
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The FDJA gives a federal dis-
trict court power to review a de-
claratory action in any "case of
actual controversy within its juris-
diction" and to "declare the rights
and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such dec-
laration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought."
Nautilus Insurance Co., 15 F.3d
at 375 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201)
(emphasis added).
Further, the court found that a
federal district court must not de-
cline review of a declaratory judg-
ment action out of "whim or per-
sonal disinclination," butmust have
"good reason." Nautilus Insur-
ance Co., 15 F.3d at 375 (citations
omitted). The court must consider
whether the declaratory action will
serve a useful purpose in clarifying
and settling the legal relations at
issue, and terminate and afford re-
lief from the uncertainty, insecu-
rity, and controversy giving rise to
the proceeding. Nautilus Insur-
ance Co., 15 F.3d at 375 (quoting
Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co. v. Quarles,
92 F.2d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.
1937)).
The court also remarked that
federal declaratory actions are of-
ten used to resolve disputes over
liability insurance coverage even
when judgment is pending on the
underlying obligation in state court.
Nautilus Insurance Co., 15 F.3d
at 375-76. Moreover, the court
determined that indemnity disputes
are suitable for declaratory resolu-
tion because early determination
of the rights and obligations of the
parties identifies the bearer of li-
ability on the underlying claim. Id.
at 376.
The district court relied on the
recent decision in Mitcheson v.
Harris, 955 F.2d 235 (4th Cir.
1992) as authority for dismissing
the declaratory action. However,
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in Nautilus Ins. Co., the court held
thatMitcheson did not announce a
per se rule forbidding a federal
court from entertaining a declara-
tory action in an indemnity dispute
during the pendency of related liti-
gation in state court. Nautilus
Insurance Co., 15 F.3d at 376.
Rather, Mitcheson held that when
a party seeks a declaratory judg-
ment action under these circum-
stances, the court must balance
concerns of federalism, efficiency,
and comity, with the usefulness of
entertaining the declaratory action.
Id. TheMitcheson court also sug-
gested consideration of the follow-
ing factors when addressing these
concerns: 1) the strength of the
state's interest in having the issues
decided in state court; 2) whether
the issues underlying the federal
action can be more efficiently re-
solved in the pending state action;
and 3) whether proceeding with the
federal action would result in un-
necessary "entanglement" due to
"overlapping issues of fact or
law." Id. at 376-77 (citing
Mitcheson 955 F.2d at 237-40).
The court in Nautilus Insurance
Co. added an additional factor: 4)
whether the declaratory judgment
action is being used as a device for
"procedural fencing." Nautilus
Insurance Co., 15 F. 3d at 377.
The court defined "procedural
fencing" as a maneuver by a party
in a race for res judicata or an
attempt to achieve a federal hear-
ing in a case otherwise not remov-
able to federal court. Id.
The Mitcheson court held that
entertaining the declaratory action
would not serve judicial efficiency
or comity. Id. at 377. That court
also held that the state's interest in
having the issues decided in state
court outweighed the federal court's
exercise of jurisdiction over the
declaratory action. Id. at 377. In
reaching its decision, Mitcheson
considered that the pending litiga-
tion in state court was governed by
unsettled state law and the parties
and issues were the same as in the
declaratory action. Id.
In the present case, the court of
appeals found no compelling state
interest in having the declaratory
action decided in state court. The
court reasoned that although all the
issues raised in the federal action
were governed by state law, the
state issues were not close, diffi-
cult, or problematic. Id. at 378.
The state questions involved rou-
tine application of settled principles
of law to particular disputed facts.
Id. Therefore, the exercise of fed-
eral jurisdiction would not inter-
fere with the state's interest in hav-
ing those issues decided in state
court.
Guided by the Supreme Court
decision in Brillhart v. Excess Ins.
Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942), the court
of appeals concluded that the fed-
eral district court could have re-
solved the controversy more effi-
ciently than the state court. Id.
Brillhart espoused that a court
must consider whether the ques-
tions in controversy between the
parties to a federal suit can be
better settled in the proceedings
pending in state court. Id. at 378-
79 (citing Brillhart, 316 U.S. at
495). To answer these questions,
a court must carefully review the
scope of the pending state court
litigation. This includes a determi-
nation as to whether all the claims
can be satisfactorily adjudicated in
the federal proceeding and if all
parties have been joined and are
amenable to the federal proceed-
ings. Id. In Nautilus Insurance
Co., the court found that judicial
efficiency would not be served by
dismissing the federal declaratory
action because the indemnity dis-
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pute raised in the federal action
was not raised in either of the two
pending state actions and not all
the parties in the indemnity dispute
were joined as parties in the pend-
ing state actions. Nautilus Insur-
ance Co., 15 F.3d at 379.
Another factor in the court's
analysis was whether the state court
remedy could provide a "more ef-
fective or efficient" means of re-
solving the case. Id. When the
motion to dismiss was made, the
trial was less than a week away and
substantial issues had already been
resolved by the district court. Con-
sequently, the court stated that
pursuing a remedy in state court
would not be the most "effective or
efficient" means of resolving the
case. Further, dismissing the case
would create delay and unneces-
sary cost by requiring the parties to
start over in a different court. Id.
Finally, the court noted that
allowing the action to proceed in
federal court would not involve
unnecessary entanglement between
the federal and state court systems
because the issues involved sepa-
rate and independent legal contro-
versies. 1d. The court further
pointed out that the declaratory
action was not being used as a
device for procedural fencing be-
cause the parties were not seeking
to invoke resjudicata or attempt-
ing to obtain a federal hearing in a
non-removable case. The parties
merely sought relief to clarify the
obligations under the indemnity
insurance policy. Id. at380. Thus,
the court held that the concerns of
federalism, efficiency, and comity,
did not sufficiently outweigh the
utility of awarding the declaratory
judgment. Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the federal district
court's dismissal of the declara-
tory judgment action. Id.
The court of appeals' decision
clarifies the circumstances under
which a federal court may decline
to entertain a declaratory action
properly within its jurisdiction.
Courts must balance the utility of
entertaining the action with con-
cerns of federalism, efficiency, and
comity. Where there is a pending
state action and a subsequent re-
quest for federal declaratory judg-
ment, the court must carefully re-
view both the pending state and
federal issues to adequately weigh
these concerns. If, after review,
the court finds that those consider-
ations do not outweigh the utility of
awarding the declaratoryjudgment,
the court must then entertain the
action. Consequently, the mere
existence of related pending state
litigation is insufficient by itself to
justify a refusal to entertain a fed-
eral declaratory action.
- Vicky L. Ivory Orem
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